Lessons Learned from COVID-19 Response in Correctional and Detention Facilities.

The COVID-19 pandemic disproportionately affected persons held in and working in correctional and detention facilities, causing facilities' traditional priorities to shift when healthcare and public health needs temporarily drove many aspects of operations. During July-August 2022, we interviewed members of health departments and criminal justice organizations to document lessons learned from the COVID-19 response in correctional settings. Participants valued enhanced partnerships, flexibility, and innovation, as well as real-time data and corrections-specific public health guidance. Challenges included cross-sector collaborations, population density, scarcity of equipment and supplies, and mental health. Most participants reported improved relationships between criminal justice and public health organizations during the pandemic. Lessons from COVID-19 can be applied to everyday public health preparedness and emergency response in correctional facilities by ensuring representation of correctional health in public health strategy and practice and providing timely, data-driven, and partner-informed guidance tailored to correctional environments when public health needs arise.

Candida auris in US Correctional Facilities.

Candida auris is an emerging fungal pathogen that typically affects patients in healthcare settings. Data on C. auris cases in correctional facilities are limited but are needed to guide public health recommendations. We describe cases and challenges of providing care for 13 patients who were transferred to correctional facilities during January 2020-December 2022 after having a positive C. auris specimen. All patients had positive specimens identified while receiving inpatient care at healthcare facilities in geographic areas with high C. auris prevalence. Correctional facilities reported challenges managing patients and implementing prevention measures; those challenges varied by whether patients were housed in prison medical units or general population units. Although rarely reported, C. auris cases in persons who are incarcerated may occur, particularly in persons with known risk factors. Measures to manage cases and prevent C. auris spread in correctional facilities should address setting-specific challenges in healthcare and nonhealthcare correctional environments.

Health Belief Model to Assess Mpox Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices among Residents and Staff, Cook County Jail, Illinois, USA, July-August 2022.

In summer 2022, a case of mpox was confirmed in a resident at the Cook County Jail (CCJ) in Chicago, Illinois, USA. We conducted in-depth interviews with CCJ residents and staff to assess mpox knowledge, attitudes, and practices; hygiene and cleaning practices; and risk behaviors. We characterized findings by using health belief model constructs. CCJ residents and staff perceived increased mpox susceptibility but were unsure about infection severity; they were motivated to protect themselves but reported limited mpox knowledge as a barrier and desired clear communication to inform preventive actions. Residents expressed low self-efficacy to protect themselves because of contextual factors, including perceived limited access to cleaning, disinfecting, and hygiene items. Our findings suggest correctional facilities can support disease prevention by providing actionable and tailored messages; educating residents and staff about risk and vaccination options; and ensuring access to and training for hygiene, cleaning, and disinfecting supplies.

Racial, Ethnic, Sex, and Age Differences in COVID-19 Cases, Hospitalizations, and Deaths Among Incarcerated People and Staff in Correctional Facilities in Six Jurisdictions, United States, March-July 2020.

OBJECTIVES: To examine disparities by sex, age group, and race and ethnicity in COVID-19 confirmed cases, hospitalizations, and deaths among incarcerated people and staff in correctional facilities. METHODS: Six U.S. jurisdictions reported data on COVID-19 confirmed cases, hospitalizations, and deaths stratified by sex, age group, and race and ethnicity for incarcerated people and staff in correctional facilities during March 1- July 31, 2020. We calculated incidence rates and rate ratios (RR) and absolute rate differences (RD) by sex, age group, and race and ethnicity, and made comparisons to the U.S. general population. RESULTS: Compared with the U.S. general population, incarcerated people and staff had higher COVID-19 case incidence (RR = 14.1, 95% CI = 13.9-14.3; RD = 6,692.2, CI = 6,598.8-6,785.5; RR = 6.0, CI = 5.7-6.3; RD = 2523.0, CI = 2368.1-2677.9, respectively); incarcerated people also had higher rates of COVID-19-related deaths (RR = 1.6, CI = 1.4-1.9; RD = 23.6, CI = 14.9-32.2). Rates of COVID-19 cases, hospitalizations, and deaths among incarcerated people and corrections staff differed by sex, age group, and race and ethnicity. The COVID-19 hospitalization (RR = 0.9, CI = 0.8-1.0; RD = -48.0, CI = -79.1- -16.8) and death rates (RR = 0.8, CI = 0.6-1.0; RD = -11.8, CI = -23.5- -0.1) for Black incarcerated people were lower than those for Black people in the general population. COVID-19 case incidence, hospitalizations, and deaths were higher among older incarcerated people, but not among staff. CONCLUSIONS: With a few exceptions, living or working in a correctional setting was associated with higher risk of COVID-19 infection and resulted in worse health outcomes compared with the general population; however, Black incarcerated people fared better than their U.S. general population counterparts.

Screening and Testing for Hepatitis B Virus Infection: CDC Recommendations - United States, 2023.

Chronic hepatitis B virus (HBV) infection can lead to substantial morbidity and mortality. Although treatment is not considered curative, antiviral treatment, monitoring, and liver cancer surveillance can reduce morbidity and mortality. Effective vaccines to prevent hepatitis B are available. This report updates and expands CDC's previously published Recommendations for Identification and Public Health Management of Persons with Chronic Hepatitis B Virus Infection (MMWR Recomm Rep 2008;57[No. RR-8]) regarding screening for HBV infection in the United States. New recommendations include hepatitis B screening using three laboratory tests at least once during a lifetime for adults aged ≥18 years. The report also expands risk-based testing recommendations to include the following populations, activities, exposures, or conditions associated with increased risk for HBV infection: persons incarcerated or formerly incarcerated in a jail, prison, or other detention setting; persons with a history of sexually transmitted infections or multiple sex partners; and persons with a history of hepatitis C virus infection. In addition, to provide increased access to testing, anyone who requests HBV testing should receive it, regardless of disclosure of risk, because many persons might be reluctant to disclose stigmatizing risks.

Recent Incarceration Among Individuals Infected With Hepatitis A Virus During Person-to-Person Community Outbreaks, United States, 2016-2020.

OBJECTIVES: Although many people who are incarcerated have risk factors for hepatitis A virus (HAV) infection, the proportion of hepatitis A cases among people with a recent incarceration is unknown. We examined the relationship between recent incarceration and HAV infection during community-based, person-to-person outbreaks to inform public health recommendations. METHODS: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention surveyed health departments in 33 jurisdictions reporting person-to-person HAV outbreaks during 2016-2020 on the number of outbreak-associated cases, HAV-infected people recently incarcerated, and HAV-associated hospitalizations and deaths. RESULTS: Twenty-five health departments reported 18 327 outbreak-associated hepatitis A cases during January 11, 2016-January 24, 2020. In total, 2093 (11.4%) HAV-infected people had been recently incarcerated. Of those with complete data, 1402 of 1462 (95.9%) had been held in a local jail, and 1513 of 1896 (79.8.%) disclosed hepatitis A risk factors. Eighteen jurisdictions reported incarceration timing relative to the exposure period. Of 9707 cases in these jurisdictions, 991 (10.2%) were among recently incarcerated people; 451 of 688 (65.6%) people with complete data had been incarcerated during all (n = 55) or part (n = 396) of their exposure period. CONCLUSIONS: Correctional facilities are important settings for reaching people with risk factors for HAV infection and can also be venues where transmission occurs. Providing HAV vaccination to incarcerated people, particularly people housed in jails, can be an effective component of community-wide outbreak response.

Transmission potential of vaccinated and unvaccinated persons infected with the SARS-CoV-2 Delta variant in a federal prison, July-August 2021.

BACKGROUND: The extent to which vaccinated persons who become infected with SARS-CoV-2 contribute to transmission is unclear. During a SARS-CoV-2 Delta variant outbreak among incarcerated persons with high vaccination rates in a federal prison, we assessed markers of viral shedding in vaccinated and unvaccinated persons. METHODS: Consenting incarcerated persons with confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection provided mid-turbinate nasal specimens daily for 10 consecutive days and reported symptom data via questionnaire. Real-time reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), viral whole genome sequencing, and viral culture was performed on these nasal specimens. Duration of RT-PCR positivity and viral culture positivity was assessed using survival analysis. RESULTS: A total of 957 specimens were provided by 93 participants, of whom 78 (84 %) were vaccinated and 17 (16 %) were unvaccinated. No significant differences were detected in duration of RT-PCR positivity among vaccinated participants (median: 13 days) versus those unvaccinated (median: 13 days; p = 0.50), or in duration of culture positivity (medians: 5 days and 5 days; p = 0.29). Among vaccinated participants, overall duration of culture positivity was shorter among Moderna vaccine recipients versus Pfizer (p = 0.048) or Janssen (p = 0.003) vaccine recipients. In post-hoc analyses, Moderna vaccine recipients demonstrated significantly shorter duration of culture positivity compared to unvaccinated participants (p = 0.02). When restricted to participants without reported prior infection, the difference between Moderna vaccine recipients and unvaccinated participants was more pronounced (medians: 3 days and 6 days, p = 0.002). CONCLUSIONS: Infectious periods for vaccinated and unvaccinated persons who become infected with SARS-CoV-2 are similar and can be highly variable, though some vaccinated persons are likely infectious for shorter durations. These findings are critically important, especially in congregate settings where viral transmission can lead to large outbreaks. In such settings, clinicians and public health practitioners should consider vaccinated, infected persons to be no less infectious than unvaccinated, infected persons.

SARS-CoV-2 viral shedding in vaccinated and unvaccinated persons: A case series.

The preclinical time course of SARS-CoV-2 shedding is not well-described. Understanding this time course will help to inform risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission. During an outbreak in a congregate setting, we collected paired mid-turbinate nasal swabs for antigen testing and reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) every other day from all consenting infected and exposed persons. Among 12 persons tested prospectively before and during SARS-CoV-2 infection, ten of 12 participants (83%) had completed a primary COVID-19 vaccination series prior to the outbreak. We recovered SARS-CoV-2 in viral culture from 9/12 (75%) of participants. All three persons from whom we did not recover SARS-CoV-2 in viral culture had completed their primary vaccination series. We recovered SARS-CoV-2 from viral culture in 6/9 vaccinated persons and before symptom onset in 3/6 symptomatic persons. These findings underscore the need for both non-pharmaceutical interventions and vaccination to mitigate transmission.

Monkeypox Case Investigation - Cook County Jail, Chicago, Illinois, July-August 2022.

Knowledge about monkeypox transmission risk in congregate settings is limited. In July 2022, the Chicago Department of Public Health (CDPH) confirmed a case of monkeypox in a person detained in Cook County Jail (CCJ) in Chicago, Illinois. This case was the first identified in a correctional setting in the United States and reported to CDC during the 2022 multinational monkeypox outbreak. CDPH collaborated with CCJ, the Illinois Department of Public Health (IDPH), and CDC to evaluate transmission risk within the facility. Fifty-seven residents were classified as having intermediate-risk exposures to the patient with monkeypox during the 7-day interval between the patient's symptom onset and his isolation. (Intermediate-risk exposure was defined as potentially being within 6 ft of the patient with monkeypox for a total of ≥3 hours cumulatively, without wearing a surgical mask or respirator, or potentially having contact between their own intact skin or clothing and the skin lesions or body fluids from the patient or with materials that were in contact with the patient's skin lesions or body fluids.) No secondary cases were identified among a subset of 62% of these potentially exposed residents who received symptom monitoring, serologic testing, or both. Thirteen residents accepted postexposure prophylaxis (PEP), with higher acceptance among those who were offered counseling individually or in small groups than among those who were offered PEP together in a large group. Monkeypox virus (MPXV) DNA, but no viable virus, was detected on one surface in a dormitory where the patient had been housed with other residents before he was isolated. Although monkeypox transmission might be limited in similar congregate settings in the absence of higher-risk exposures, congregate facilities should maintain recommended infection control practices in response to monkeypox cases, including placing the person with monkeypox in medical isolation and promptly and thoroughly cleaning and disinfecting spaces where the person has spent time. In addition, officials should provide information to residents and staff members about monkeypox symptoms and transmission modes, facilitate confidential monkeypox risk and symptom disclosure and prompt medical evaluation for symptoms that are reported, and provide PEP counseling in a private setting.

Risk factors and genotype distribution of hepatitis C virus in Georgia: A nationwide population-based survey.

In preparation for the National Hepatitis C Elimination Program in the country of Georgia, a nationwide household-based hepatitis C virus (HCV) seroprevalence survey was conducted in 2015. Data were used to estimate HCV genotype distribution and better understand potential sex-specific risk factors that contribute to HCV transmission. HCV genotype distribution by sex and reported risk factors were calculated. We used explanatory logistic regression models stratified by sex to identify behavioral and healthcare-related risk factors for HCV seropositivity, and predictive logistic regression models to identify additional variables that could help predict the presence of infection. Factors associated with HCV seropositivity in explanatory models included, among males, history of injection drug use (IDU) (aOR = 22.4, 95% CI = 12.7, 39.8) and receiving a blood transfusion (aOR = 3.6, 95% CI = 1.4, 8.8), and among females, history of receiving a blood transfusion (aOR = 4.0, 95% CI 2.1, 7.7), kidney dialysis (aOR = 7.3 95% CI 1.5, 35.3) and surgery (aOR = 1.9, 95% CI 1.1, 3.2). The male-specific predictive model additionally identified age, urban residence, and history of incarceration as factors predictive of seropositivity and were used to create a male-specific exposure index (Area under the curve [AUC] = 0.84). The female-specific predictive model had insufficient discriminatory performance to support creating an exposure index (AUC = 0.61). The most prevalent HCV genotype (GT) nationally was GT1b (40.5%), followed by GT3 (34.7%) and GT2 (23.6%). Risk factors for HCV seropositivity and distribution of HCV genotypes in Georgia vary substantially by sex. The HCV exposure index developed for males could be used to inform targeted testing programs.

COVID-19 vaccination in the Federal Bureau of Prisons, December 2020-April 2021.

OBJECTIVES: To describe COVID-19 vaccine distribution operations in United States Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) institutions and offices from December 16, 2020-April 14, 2021, report vaccination coverage among staff and incarcerated people, and identify factors associated with vaccination acceptance among incarcerated people. METHODS: The BOP COVID-19 vaccination plan and implementation timeline are described. Descriptive statistics and vaccination coverage were calculated for the BOP incarcerated population using data from the BOP electronic medical record. Coverage among staff was calculated using data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Vaccination Administration Management System. Vaccination coverage in the BOP versus the overall United States adult population was compared by state/territory. Univariate and multivariable logistic regression models were developed to identify demographic, health-related, and institution-level factors associated with vaccination acceptance among incarcerated people, using hierarchical linear modeling to account for institution-level clustering. RESULTS: By April 14, 2021, BOP had offered COVID-19 vaccination to 37,870 (100%) staff and 88,173/126,413 (69.8%) incarcerated people, with acceptance rates of 50.2% and 64.2%, respectively. At the time of analysis, vaccination coverage in BOP was comparable to coverage in the overall adult population in the states and territories where BOP institutions and offices are located. Among incarcerated people, factors associated with lower vaccination acceptance included younger age, female sex, non-Hispanic Black and Asian race/ethnicity, and having few underlying medical conditions; factors associated with higher acceptance included having a prior SARS-CoV-2 infection, being born outside the United States, and being assigned to a Federal Detention Center. CONCLUSIONS: Early COVID-19 vaccination efforts in BOP have achieved levels of coverage similar to the general population. To build on this initial success, BOP can consider strategies including re-offering vaccination to people who initially refused and tailoring communication strategies to groups with lower acceptance rates.

Outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 B.1.617.2 (Delta) Variant Infections Among Incarcerated Persons in a Federal Prison - Texas, July-August 2021.

Incarcerated populations have experienced disproportionately higher rates of COVID-19-related illness and death compared with the general U.S. population, due in part to congregate living environments that can facilitate rapid transmission of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, and the high prevalence of underlying medical conditions associated with severe COVID-19 (1,2). The SARS-CoV-2 B.1.617.2 (Delta) variant has caused outbreaks among vaccinated and unvaccinated persons in congregate settings and large public gatherings (3,4). During July 2021, a COVID-19 outbreak involving the Delta variant was identified in a federal prison in Texas, infecting 172 of 233 (74%) incarcerated persons in two housing units. The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) partnered with CDC to investigate. CDC analyzed data on infection status, symptom onset date, hospitalizations, and deaths among incarcerated persons. The attack rate was higher among unvaccinated versus fully vaccinated persons (39 of 42, 93% versus 129 of 185, 70%; p = 0.002).† Four persons were hospitalized, three of whom were unvaccinated, and one person died, who was unvaccinated. Among a subset of 70 persons consenting to an embedded serial swabbing protocol, the median interval between symptom onset and last positive reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) test result in fully vaccinated versus unvaccinated persons was similar (9 versus 11 days, p = 0.37). One or more specimens were culture-positive from five of 12 (42%) unvaccinated and 14 of 37 (38%) fully vaccinated persons for whom viral culture was attempted. In settings where physical distancing is challenging, including correctional and detention facilities, vaccination and implementation of multicomponent prevention strategies (e.g., testing, medical isolation, quarantine, and masking) are critical to limiting SARS-CoV-2 transmission (5).

SARS-CoV-2 Infection Among Correctional Staff in the Federal Bureau of Prisons.

Objectives. To examine SARS-CoV-2 (severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2) epidemiology and risk factors among Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) staff in the United States.Methods. We calculated the SARS-CoV-2 case rate among 37 640 BOP staff from March 12 to June 17, 2020, using payroll and COVID-19-specific data. We compared occupational factors among staff with and without known SARS-CoV-2 using multiple logistic regression, controlling for demographic characteristics. We calculated relative risk among staff in stand-alone institutions versus complexes (> 1 institution).Results. SARS-CoV-2 was reported by 665 staff across 59.8% of institutions, a case rate of 1766.6 per 100 000. Working in dorm-style housing and in detention centers were strong risk factors, whereas cell-based housing was protective; these effects were erased in complexes. Occupational category was not associated with SARS-CoV-2.Conclusions. SARS-CoV-2 infection was more likely among staff working in institutions where physical distancing and limiting exposure to a consistent set of staff and inmates are challenging.Public Health Implications. Mitigation strategies-including augmented staff testing, entry and exit testing among inmates, limiting staff interactions across complexes, and increasing physical distancing by reducing occupancy in dorm-style housing-may prevent SARS-CoV-2 infections among correctional staff.

COVID-19 Case and Mortality Rates in the Federal Bureau of Prisons.

INTRODUCTION: People living in correctional facilities are at high risk for contracting COVID-19. To characterize the burden of COVID-19 in the Federal Bureau of Prisons, inmate testing, case, and mortality rates are calculated and compared with those of the U.S. METHODS: Federal Bureau of Prisons data were derived from its inmate management system and a Federal Bureau of Prisons COVID-19-specific database. U.S. data were derived from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the U.S. Census. Data were aggregated from February to September 2020 and accessed in September and November 2020. Testing rates were calculated for both the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the U.S. Case and infection fatality rates were calculated overall and by institution and compared with those of the U.S. An age- and sex-standardized mortality ratio was calculated. RESULTS: The Federal Bureau of Prisons tested more than half of its inmates (50.3%); its crude case and mortality rates were 11,710.1 and 77.4 per 100,000, respectively. Compared with the U.S., the case ratio was 4.7, and the standardized mortality ratio was 2.6. The infection fatality rate for both the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the U.S. was 0.7%. Among institutions that tested ≥85% of inmates, the combined infection fatality rate was 0.8% and ranged from 0.0% to 3.0%. CONCLUSIONS: The Federal Bureau of Prisons COVID-19 case rates and standard mortality ratio were approximately 5 and 2.5 times those in U.S. adults, respectively, consistent with those of prisons nationwide. High testing rates and standardized death reporting could result in a more accurate infection fatality rate in the Federal Bureau of Prisons than in the U.S. Testing and other mitigation strategies, including reducing the population, have likely prevented further transmission and mortality in the Federal Bureau of Prisons.

Mass SARS-CoV-2 Testing in a Dormitory-Style Correctional Facility in Arkansas.

Objectives. To assess SARS-CoV-2 transmission within a correctional facility and recommend mitigation strategies.Methods. From April 29 to May 15, 2020, we established the point prevalence of COVID-19 among incarcerated persons and staff within a correctional facility in Arkansas. Participants provided respiratory specimens for SARS-CoV-2 testing and completed questionnaires on symptoms and factors associated with transmission.Results. Of 1647 incarcerated persons and 128 staff tested, 30.5% of incarcerated persons (range by housing unit = 0.0%-58.2%) and 2.3% of staff tested positive for SARS-CoV-2. Among those who tested positive and responded to symptom questions (431 incarcerated persons, 3 staff), 81.2% and 33.3% were asymptomatic, respectively. Most incarcerated persons (58.0%) reported wearing cloth face coverings 8 hours or less per day, and 63.3% reported close contact with someone other than their bunkmate.Conclusions. If testing remained limited to symptomatic individuals, fewer cases would have been detected or detection would have been delayed, allowing transmission to continue. Rapid implementation of mass testing and strict enforcement of infection prevention and control measures may be needed to mitigate spread of SARS-CoV-2 in this setting.

A review of network simulation models of hepatitis C virus and HIV among people who inject drugs.

Network modelling is a valuable tool for simulating hepatitis C virus (HCV) and HIV transmission among people who inject drugs (PWID) and assessing the potential impact of treatment and harm-reduction interventions. In this paper, we review literature on network simulation models, highlighting key structural considerations and questions that network models are well suited to address. We describe five approaches (Erdös-Rényi, Stochastic Block, Watts-Strogatz, Barabási-Albert, and Exponential Random Graph Model) used to model partnership formation with emphasis on the strengths of each approach in simulating different features of real-world PWID networks. We also review two important structural considerations when designing or interpreting results from a network simulation study: (1) dynamic vs. static network and (2) injection only vs. both injection and sexual networks. Dynamic network simulations allow partnerships to evolve and disintegrate over time, capturing corresponding shifts in individual and population-level risk behaviour; however, their high level of complexity and reliance on difficult-to-observe data has driven others to develop static network models. Incorporating both sexual and injection partnerships increases model complexity and data demands, but more accurately represents HIV transmission between PWID and their sexual partners who may not also use drugs. Network models add the greatest value when used to investigate how leveraging network structure can maximize the effectiveness of health interventions and optimize investments. For example, network models have shown that features of a given network and epidemic influence whether the greatest community benefit would be achieved by allocating hepatitis C or HIV treatment randomly, versus to those with the most partners. They have also demonstrated the potential for syringe services and "buddy sharing" programs to reduce disease transmission.

Mass Testing for SARS-CoV-2 in 16 Prisons and Jails - Six Jurisdictions, United States, April-May 2020.

Preventing coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in correctional and detention facilities* can be challenging because of population-dense housing, varied access to hygiene facilities and supplies, and limited space for isolation and quarantine (1). Incarcerated and detained populations have a high prevalence of chronic diseases, increasing their risk for severe COVID-19-associated illness and making early detection critical (2,3). Correctional and detention facilities are not closed systems; SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, can be transmitted to and from the surrounding community through staff member and visitor movements as well as entry, transfer, and release of incarcerated and detained persons (1). To better understand SARS-CoV-2 prevalence in these settings, CDC requested data from 15 jurisdictions describing results of mass testing events among incarcerated and detained persons and cases identified through earlier symptom-based testing. Six jurisdictions reported SARS-CoV-2 prevalence of 0%-86.8% (median = 29.3%) from mass testing events in 16 adult facilities. Before mass testing, 15 of the 16 facilities had identified at least one COVID-19 case among incarcerated or detained persons using symptom-based testing, and mass testing increased the total number of known cases from 642 to 8,239. Case surveillance from symptom-based testing has likely underestimated SARS-CoV-2 prevalence in correctional and detention facilities. Broad-based testing can provide a more accurate assessment of prevalence and generate data to help control transmission (4).

Hepatitis C prevalence and risk factors in Georgia, 2015: setting a baseline for elimination.

BACKGROUND: The country of Georgia launched the world's first Hepatitis C Virus (HCV) Elimination Program in 2015 and set a 90% prevalence reduction goal for 2020. We conducted a nationally representative HCV seroprevalence survey to establish baseline prevalence to measure progress toward elimination over time. METHODS: A cross-sectional seroprevalence survey was conducted in 2015 among adults aged ≥18 years using a stratified, multi-stage cluster design (n = 7000). Questionnaire variables included demographic, medical, and behavioral risk characteristics and HCV-related knowledge. Blood specimens were tested for antibodies to HCV (anti-HCV) and HCV RNA. Frequencies were computed for HCV prevalence, risk factors, and HCV-related knowledge. Associations between anti-HCV status and potential risk factors were calculated using logistic regression. RESULTS: National anti-HCV seroprevalence in Georgia was 7.7% (95% confidence interval (CI) = 6.7, 8.9); HCV RNA prevalence was 5.4% (95% CI = 4.6, 6.4). Testing anti-HCV+ was significantly associated with male sex, unemployment, urban residence, history of injection drug use (IDU), incarceration, blood transfusion, tattoos, frequent dental cleanings, medical injections, dialysis, and multiple lifetime sexual partners. History of IDU (adjusted odds ratio (AOR) = 21.4, 95% CI = 12.3, 37.4) and blood transfusion (AOR = 4.5, 95% CI = 2.8, 7.2) were independently, significantly associated with testing anti-HCV+ after controlling for sex, age, urban vs. rural residence, and history of incarceration. Among anti-HCV+ participants, 64.0% were unaware of their HCV status, and 46.7% did not report IDU or blood transfusion as a risk factor. CONCLUSIONS: Georgia has a high HCV burden, and a majority of infected persons are unaware of their status. Ensuring a safe blood supply, implementing innovative screening strategies beyond a risk-based approach, and intensifying prevention efforts among persons who inject drugs are necessary steps to reach Georgia's HCV elimination goal.

Cost analysis of sofosbuvir/ribavirin versus sofosbuvir/simeprevir for genotype 1 hepatitis C virus in interferon-ineligible/intolerant individuals.

UNLABELLED: Treatment guidance for chronic hepatitis C (CHC) released by the American Association for the Study of Liver Diseases (AASLD) and the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA) offers two options for interferon (IFN)-ineligible/intolerant individuals with genotype 1 infection: sofosbuvir/ribavirin (SOF/RBV) for 24 weeks or sofosbuvir/simeprevir (SOF/SMV) for 12 weeks. A 24-week course of SOF/RBV costs approximately US$169,000, with sustained virologic response (SVR) rates ranging from 52% to 84%; 12 weeks of SOF/SMV costs approximately $150,000, with SVR between 89% and 100%. Because SOF/SMV is currently used off-label, debate exists among physicians and payers about whether it should be prescribed and covered. This article presents a cost-effectiveness analysis of these two treatment regimens accounting for costs of drugs, treatment-related medical care, retreatment for individuals who do not achieve SVR, and natural history of continued HCV infection after failed retreatment. Analysis uses a Markov model with a lifetime horizon and a societal perspective. In the base-case scenario, SOF/SMV dominated SOF/RBV in a modeled 50-year-old cohort of treatment-naïve and -experienced subjects, excluding those who failed earlier therapy with telaprevir or boceprevir. SOF/SMV yielded lower costs and more quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) for the average subject, compared to SOF/RBV ($165,336 and 14.69 QALYs vs. $243,586 and 14.45 QALYs, respectively). In base-case cost analysis, the SOF/SMV treatment strategy saved $91,590 per SVR, compared to SOF/RBV. Under all one-way sensitivity scenarios, SOF/SMV remained dominant and resulted in cost savings. CONCLUSIONS: These results suggest that a 12-week course of SOF/SMV is a more cost-effective treatment for genotype 1 CHC than 24 weeks of SOF/RBV among IFN-ineligible/intolerant individuals, supporting the AASLD/IDSA guidance and offering implications for both clinical and regulatory decision making as well as pharmaceutical pricing.